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Sometimes literature, especially fiction, is able to show us things that
philosophy cannot; it can allow us a glimpse into certain
philosophical blind spots. This is especially significant since these
blind spots, these dark corners, often conceal precisely those issues,
or perhaps neuroses and paranoias, which have exerted the most
pervasive influence in shaping philosophical attitudes and even
philosophy itself. When, for example, Mrs Moore in E.M Forster's
A Passage to India is overcome in one of the Marabar Caves, she
exposes more than her fair share of Western philosophy's hidden
demons:
The echo in a Marabar cave... is entirely devoid of distinction.
Whatever is said, the same monotonous noise replies ... 'Bourn'
is the sound as far as the human alphabet can express it, or
'bou-oum', or 'ou-boum' - utterly dull. Hope, politeness, the
blowing of a nose, the squeak of a boot, all produce 'bourn' ...
when she chanced to be fatigued, it had managed to murmur:
'Pathos, piety, courage - they exist, but are identical, and so is
filth. Everything exists, nothing has value.' If one had spoken
vileness in that place, or quoted lofty poetry, the comment would
have been the same - 'ou-boum'. If one had spoken with the
tongues of angels and pleaded for all the unhappiness and
misunderstanding in the world, past, present and to come, for all
the misery men must undergo... it would amount to the same...
at the edge of her mind, Religion appeared, poor little talkative
Christianity, and she knew that all its divine words... only
amounted to 'bourn'... she was terrified... the universe, never
comprehensible to her intellect, offered no repose to her soul. 1
What Forster exquisitely conjures up here is a spectre which has
haunted Western perceptions of Indian thought since at least the
Romantic period, and it has been especially noticeable when it
comes to the thorny issues of Advaitan Hindu and Madhyamika
1 E.M. Forster, A Passage to India, (1924) (Harmondsworth, 1984 reprint) pp144,
146.
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Buddhist non-duality (that is: where any distinction between
perceiving subject and perceived object dissolves; often, it is
conceptualised as a state of 'oneness' or 'non-separateness'). The
problem, and with it Mrs Moore's terror, hinges upon what had,
until very recently, been the dominant view in Western thought of a
referential or representational view of ethics and morality, and a
certain representational conception of epistemology tied up with it.
This view goes something like this: ethics and epistemology
come together in the notion of 'truth' which comes about when
'being' is faithfully represented, or reflected. This, perhaps
unavoidably, opens up a certain transcendent element. 'Truth' and
'being' - epistemological validity and an underlying ontology -
are separate (and must remain separate if their relation is to
'objectively' mean anything), yet nevertheless, they are still
inextricably related inasmuch as one reflects the other; and it is
ethics which ensures the constancy of this relation, either by
deeming a faithful representation of 'being' as 'true' or 'honest',
or an unfaithful reflection as 'deceptive' or 'dishonest'. Either way,
the underlying relation between 'truth' and 'being', whether
accurately reflected or not, is taken for granted, thus allowing it to
act as a basis for morality.
It is a model which probably goes back to Plato's Timaeus where
the realm of Being - which is equated with the Ideal or the Good -
is opposed to the realm of Becoming which acts as a poor reflection
of Being. At best, 'Becoming' can be 'true', but of course this also
opens up the possibility that it could be 'false' too: this
indeterminacy is what makes it ontologically imperfect, and morally
suspect, in comparison to Being which is beyond reproach. 1 This
separation is perhaps even apparent in the Garden of Eden account
with the need to make a firm and sharp distinction between the
moral, yet tainted, 'Tree of Good and Evil' and the more
ontologically orientated and undefilable 'Tree of Life' which is
fiercely guarded by 'cherubim and a flaming sword'.2 The relation,
yet intensely maintained and guarded separation, between 'truth'
and 'being', 'ethics' and 'ontology', has its origins in both the
Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian sides of our Western heritage.
This framework helps explain why the ethical implications of
non-duality - especially non-duality in an other culture - have
traditionally proven so difficult to deal with for Western interpreters.
ISee the Timaeus trans. Desmond Lee, Plato: Timaeus and Critias,
(Harmondsworth, 1977) pp41-2.
2 Genesis 3:23-4 (New International Version).
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For in a state of non-duality, this necessary 'gap' between 'being'
and 'truth' seems to collapse in on itself, and morality seems to
collapse along with it. There no longer seems to be room for the
transcendence necessary for ethical standards.
The cross-cultural difficulties can be neatly illustrated in the
Sanskrit term sat which can mean both 'being' and 'truth', as well
as carrying moral weight too, as in phrases such as 'saddharma',
'the virtuous teaching'. The implication of the Sanskrit is that 'to
be' is 'to be good', which must necessarily involve being truthful:
being, virtue and truth all exist at the same ontological level. But
when read in the light of a transcendentally based ethical system this
apparent ambiguity opens up the potential for some disastrous
misinterpretations. Not that anyone, thankfully, has ever done this,
but suppose, for example, that Krishna's famous declaration to
Arjuna of 'sad asac caham', 'I am being and non-being', were
translated - as it literally could be translated - as 'I am truth and
untruth'.1 There would be no end to the religious and ethical
complications, not to mention opening up the dreaded liar paradox:
can one truthfully declare that one is untruth? In a sense, Mrs
Moore's terror virtually takes place within the confronting overlap
of these three connotations of the term sat; yet these supposed
dangers would not, and probably could not, have occurred to
Sanskrit speakers themselves.
From Western ethics' traditional representational perspective,
when sat (truth) and sat (virtue) apparently melt into sat (being),
moral judgments suddenly seem impossible. A separate reference
point from which - or against which - to make moral judgments
apparently disappears; and for this Indian thought has often met
with righteous Western indignation. However, there is a stark
ideological, perhaps Orientalist, side to this. For all the shock and
horror we see in Western interpretations is not so much a response
to the loss of separate reference points altogether - although
naturally this is how the problem is loudly presented - but rather it
is because the Western interpreter's own 'separate' or 'objective'
moral vantage point seems to disappear. What was proclaimed from
on high suddenly appears as 'poor little talkative Christianity'.
Now, this is not to say that there is no threat of relativism in some
conceptions of non-duality, nor that the ethical danger of losing
any vantage point may not be a genuine one. Indians and Tibetans
themselves have traditionally considered this a very real threat,
1 Bhagavad Gita 9.19d, my translation(s); Sanskrit edited by Franklin Edgerton,
The Bhagavad Gita (Delhi, 1996 reprint) p93.
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particularly when conceptions of non-duality have threatened the
moral workings of karma. Within the Tibetan tradition, the debates
at bSam yas monastery towards the end of the eighth century have
continued to hold a particularly significant place precisely because
it was there that the so-called ethical quietism of the Chan (Zen)
school (as represented by the Chinese teacher Hva Shang) was
defeated.l Hva Shang's teachings were, and still are, held up as the
prototype of just this sort of moral (karmic) relativism which can
result from an overly vague and intellectually sluggish conception
of ultimate reality (that is: emptiness, sunyati).2 The significance
Hva Shang's defeat is accorded in the Tibetan tradition testifies to
just how seriously this moral threat of relativism was taken.
Rather, what I am suggesting is that the charge of an all-out
relativism can all too easily act as a shield behind which to hide a
threat to one's own position, and this too is a trap into which
traditional Indian and Tibetan polemics have been just as capable of
falling. Satikara's polemics against the Buddhists spring to mind as
an example of this,3 as do some of the more conservative orthodox
polemics against Satikara.4 In Tibet, some of the criticisms wielded
by the dominant dGe lugs pa school against esoteric rDzog chen
practices may well be guilty of this tendency too.
The point is that non-duality can be highly ideologically
charged, as can the charges of relativism or nihilism which are then
1 See David Seyfort Ruegg, 'On the Tibetan Historiography and Doxography of the
Great Debate of bSam yas' in Shoren Ihara and Zuiho Yamaguchi (eds) Tibetan
Studies: Proceedings of the 5th Seminar of the International Association for
Tibetan Studies, Narida 1989; Vol.1: Buddhist Philosophy and Literature (Narita,
1992), pp237-244.
2 Ruegg puts it especially well when he argues that 'the 'Great Debate' at bSam yas
often appears ... more as a semi-historical topos ... and the Hva Shang Mahayana as
a... dehistoricized and emblematic figure standing... for a certain typological
variety of Buddhism' (lbid, p240) and that 'Hva Shang's simultaneist method is
described in Tibetan sources ... as an extremely etherealized spirituality associated
with a quietistic abandonment of all activity' (p242); the target of Tibetan
polemics was a certain 'ethical and karmic quietism as well as an 'ideoclasm' that
tended toward intellectual nihilism' (p244).
3 For Sankara's polemics against the Buddhists see Gregory J. Darling, An
Evaluation of the Vedantic Critique of Buddhism (Delhi, 1987), especially p82ff,
pp125-131; AJ. Alston, Samkara on Rival Views (London, 1989), pp260-313 and
Daniel H.H. Ingalls, 'Sankara's Arguments Against the Buddhists', Philosophy
East and West, Vol. 3 (4), January 1954.
4 See K. Narain, A Critique ofMadhva Refutation of the S8n).kara School of Vedanta
(Allahabad, 1964) p44ff, pl96ff.
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levelled against it. 'Non-duality' can. be a 'weapon' for the
underdog or the outsider since it is, literally, such a great leveller.
The ensuing charge of an all-out relativism can then be a way for
the dominant voice to reclaim, or safe-guard, their threatened high-
ground. In other words, these charges can be used to conserve a
pre-existing moral order. Of course, relativism can be a genuine
threat, but we ought to be suspicious when the cry of an all-out
'relativism' is wheeled out a little too quickly, especially by those
who maintain, or are doing well out of, the mainstream religious
system. Often the eagerness to fire off the charge of nihilism or
relativism belies just how much is at stake and also just how
vulnerable the position is of those who are threatened. These
vulnerabilities, these shortcomings, are precisely what can be safely
hidden away behind the loud accusation of a universal relativism.
After all, the terror at the loss of one's own vantage point is more
immediate and desperate than the dissolving of all vantage points
into a universal relativism; it is often easier (in the sense of being
more convenient) to emphasize the latter, the universal, so as to
conceal and ignore the former, the personal. For with the 'onset' of
non-duality, when the interpreter's supposed higher reference point
- and the very notion of a higher reference point - is challenged
and held up to the light of day, it is all of a sudden rudely revealed
as having only ever been the interpreter's own, and not something
objectively 'out there'. As Mrs Moore found out, it is exposed as a
terrifying yet 'utterly dull' echo.
All of this lends a certain irony to how Western interpretations
have tended to respond to this supposed ethical crisis. That is, they
have typically then accused Indian thought of itself being trapped
within an all-engulfing subjectivity or hopeless solipsism: Indians
are the ones hypnotized by an echo; or, alternately, they are
enveloped in a pantheistic void. Either way, the ethical implications
are considered identical. And while Mrs Moore is merely overcome
by them, the arch-Romantic Friedrich Schlegel, a little more than a
century before, violently recoiled at the prospect. In a state of non-
duality, he warns that
the distinction between good and evil must unavoidably be
neutralized... [since] everything melts pantheistically into one
241
The Dark Side
single essence, and the eternal distinction between good and evil
is set aside. l
Even more alarming for Schlegel is that this seems to imply that
'all, being one, must be equally perfect[!]'2. Yet what is most
terrifying is not really that good and evil have disappeared, but
rather that a particular (Western) representational conception of
what makes good 'good' and what makes evil 'evil' seems to have
disappeared, and with it the Western interpreter's own morally
superior vantage point - this, of course, is the real dark side from
which Schlegel recoils: what could be more terrifying for him than
the prospect that his own and Indian thought might be 'equally
perfect', or even equal at all!
Schlegel's critic, the Idealist and staunch anti-Romantic Hegel,
however, does not recoil for a moment, and, characteristically, he
goes on the offensive. He contrasts his own Idealist dialectic based
on the notions of 'Concrete Oneness' and 'Being-tor-itself' with
an undeveloped and suffocating 'Abstract Oneness' and 'Being-
in-itself' which he finds in Indian thought. Hegel argues that non-
duality gives the world 'merely a negative, accidental character'3.
Non-duality, he suggests, implies that 'everything exists as merely ...
negated'4 meaning that 'all... qualities are absent... [and, as a
result,] nature, with nothing to... give it stability, reels at the mercy
of imagination'.5 Thus, finding a parallel with those supposed
aspects of Romanticism which he also attacks, Hegel concludes that
Indian thought is held captive by 'horrible, repulsive [and]
loathsome distortions',6 with no epistemologically objective way of
ever knowing that they are distortions7. Presumably here, as with
1 Friedrich Schlegel 'On the Indian Language, Literature and Philosophy', (1805-
6) Bk 2, Ch.4 in E.1. Millington (ed. and trans.) The Aesthetic and Miscellaneous
Works of Friedrich von Schlegel, (London, 1849), p483.
2 [bid, Bk 2, Ch.5, p490.
3 G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion, (delivered between 1823




7 Hegel' s brazenness, in contrast with Schlegel, may be because the exposure of an
underlying subjectivity as a driving force in interpretation and moral judgement is
not really the problem for him that it was for Schlegel (and Mrs Moore) especially
in the light of his forthright Idealist dialectic. After all, for Hegel, subjective bias
(depending of course upon whose subjectivity we are talking about!) can simply be
seen as none other than the Geist manifesting itself - which is precisely the basis
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Schlegel, Hegel is referring to philosophical Advaita Vedanta with
bits of bhakti devotionalism and tantra thrown in. Commenting on
Buddhism directly, Hegel's critique is the same, only harsher:
In so far as ...nothingness, this ... annihilation is the highest state
for man, and his destiny is to immerse himself in... non-
existence... where all determinations cease... [to that extent]
There is no...virtue [or] vice. 1
The recurring assumption is that without a clear hierarchy of
being, there is no way to determine what ultimately has value and
what does not, and that without this, there is no way to determine
right from wrong. In ontological terms - and the assumption of a
solid ontology is after all what underlies all this - there is no way of
knowing real from unreal, and this can only lead to a state of
epistemological and ethical relativism or nihilism since there no
longer appears to be any concrete relation between epistemology
and ethics, or at least, no ontologically concrete way to determine
this relation.
This representational model of truth and semantic meaning was,
in the realm of linguistics, first questioned by figures such as
Ferdinand de Saussure and Charles Sanders Peirce at the outset of
the twentieth century. For Saussure, there is no definitive one-to-one
correspondence (such as that guaranteed by the traditional notion
of truth) between word and object, but merely 'floating' signifiers
defined from each other not through reference to extra-linguistic
signifieds (that is, metaphysically substantive 'things') but simply
through their phonic differences from other signs within the
linguistic system.2 Peirce similarly moved the emphasis away from
of his phenomenology. For Hegel, the intrusion of subjectivity is not so much
rudely exposed as it is instead welcomed as simply confirming what he had already
unashamedly maintained all along. This rough summary is based on Hegel's
Phenomenology of the Geist. For some of Hegel's most succinct summaries of his
overall dialectic, see G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of the Spirit, (1807) trans. J.
Baillie, (New York, 1967) pp 211, 790ff, and G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the
Philosophy of Religion, Vo!. 2, ppI9-20.
1 Ibid, p60. By 'nothingness' and 'annihilation', Hegel is presumably referring to
the Buddhist notion of sunyata, 'emptiness'.




truth as representation to truth as defined by functionality in his
championing of 'Pragmatism'.1
More importantly though for our present purposes, it was
arguably Friedrich Nietzsche who was the first to directly challenge
this model on the ethical and philosophical front. For, as noted
earlier, being and truth, although traditionally considered separate
so that they can 'objectively' reflect each other, are nevertheless
seen as intimately related. Nietzsche exposes precisely that which
has traditionally been hidden; namely: this separation between
being and truth and the extreme fragility of the supposed 'ethical
relation' which holds them together. According to Nietzsche, if
anything has held ontology and epistemology together, then it is
not ethics, but merely a self-affirming 'will to power' concealed
beneath, or, alternately, suppressed by, the thin veneer of ethics.2
The obsessive need to appeal to a transcendent or underlying
ontology (such as God) which holds ethics and epistemology
together already belies just how tenuous their relation really is. The
postmodem critique which has followed Nietzsche has sought to
show that ethics does not have, or need, a direct relation to ontology
and, moreover, that the notion of 'truth' has little to do with this
relation. The postmodern critique has taught us to be rightly
sceptical whenever ethics - that is: one particular ethical system out
of many - claims to have a definitive relation to ontology and
epistemology. We are well aware nowadays of the issue of whose
ethics we are talking about and on whose terms, or rather, on whose
self-justifying terms, an ontology is laid down, since ontology is
never as neutral as it claims to be.
This partly explains why Buddhism in particular has appeared so
open to postmodern readings. Traditionally, Buddhism has shunned
the necessity for an underlying ontology to support an ethical
framework. Most famously, the Buddha refused to even speculate
1 See Charles Sanders Peirce in Justus Buchler (ed) The Philosophy of Peirce:
Selected Writings, (London, 1940) pp251-68 and James Hoopes (ed) Peirce on
Signs, (Chapel Hill and London, 1991), pp253-9.
2 See especially Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil, 39, ed. and trans.
Marianne Cowan (Chicago, 1955); The Will to Power 461, ed. and trans. Walter
Kaufmann and RJ. Hollingdale (London, 1968); and The Gay Science, 110, ed.
Bernard Williams, trans. Josefine Nauckhoff (Cambridge, 2001). See also Beyond
Good and Evil, 35, op cit, p42 where Nietzsche cites Voltaire's edict that 'il ne
cherche le vrai que pour faire le hien' ('He only searches for the truth for the sake of
doing good') so as to as to brush it off with the flat rejoinder: 'I bet he will find
nothing' .
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upon metaphysically loaded questions, instead remaining silent on
what came to be known as the 'undefined points' (a vyakrtavastu):
What is a question to be avoided? It is like this: 'is the world
eternal; or non-eternal; both eternal and non-eternal; or neither
eternal nor non-eternal? and does it have any limit and [what is
this] limit; or indeed does it neither have nor not have any limit?
Does the Tathagata [the Buddha] exist beyond death; or does
the Tathagata not exist beyond death? insofar as there is another
vital life-principle, is there another body? [that is: can one exist
apart from the other? or: are they identical or different?]'.1
Metaphysics and ontology, far from being essential for morality,
can actually hinder progression along the Path (marga).
Buddhism's apparent separation of ontology from ethics and truth
seems, superficially, to coincide with the postmodem project.
The second century Madhyamika Buddhist philosopher
Nagarjuna especially has become a postmodem favourite due to his
relentless attack on the notion of any inherent nature (svabhava) or
'metaphysical essence' of people, things, and even ethical concepts
and the Dharma itself, leaving in their wake only the non-dualistic
emptiness of all things, yet even this - emptiness itself - is empty
too. From a postmodern perspective - and this is not necessarily
untrue - Nagarjuna's attack is decidedly 'deconstructive': it seeks
to undermine the false conception of an inherent nature rather than
an actual existent inherent nature itself. Consequently, it has been
compared with the later Wittgenstein's suggestion that 'what we are
destroying is nothing but houses of cards'.2 For like Nagarjuna' s
attack on svabhava, Wittgenstein's implication is that what is under
attack are, like 'houses of cards', the mere constructs of
metaphysics (such as 'essence') rather than anything real; hence the
process is deconstructive, rather than destructive.
Often cited in this regard has been Nagarjuna's advice that
1 Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakosabha$ya ad Abhidharmakosa 5.22. My translation
of the Sanskrit: katamas ... sthapaniyaf) prasnaf) tad yatha sasvato loka 'sasvataf)
sasvatas casasvatas ca naiva sasvato nasasvatah antavan antas ca naivantavan
nanantavan I bhavati tathagataf) para11J maraT,l§n na bhavati tathagatal) para11J
maraT,lat yavad anyo jivo 'nyac chariram I Sanskrit edited by Swami Dwarikadas
Sastri, The Abhidharmakosa and Bha~ya of AciIya Vasubandhu, (Varanasi, 1998)
vo1.2, p630.
2 Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 118, trans. G.E.M
Anscombe, (Oxford and MaIden, Mass. 1953) p48, my italics.
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Without depending upon the conventional, the Ultimate Truth is
not taught; without coming to the Ultimate Truth, one does not
find nirva]Ja. 1
The emphasis here upon restoring the conventional (vyavahara)
status of things has been seen as a reaffirmation of 'truth as
context' or linguistic usage along the lines of Wittgenstein's
insistence that we 'may in no way interfere with the actual use of
language ... [but instead] leave... everything as it is'.2 Also widely
used in the quest for postmodem comparisons has been
Nagarjuna's famous declaration that
Samsara's distinction from nirva]Ja is nothing; nirval]a's
distinction from samsara is nothing.3
which seems to neatly correspond with the postmodem suspicion of
transcendent validity claims inasmuch as it seems to suggest that
there is no nirV81]8 which exists as a reference point beyond
samsara. Nagarjuna is seen as championing an ethical system that
rejects any semblance of transcendent or absolutist underpinning,
and which thus has little or no connection to the epistemological or
ontological realms.
On the tide of these apparent similarities, the threats of relativism
and nihilism suddenly drop out of the picture: Nagarjuna's
conception of non-dualistic emptiness is praised for precisely the
same reason that it had previously been condemned; namely, for
promoting a moral system that rejects absolutist underpinning. So,
in other words, the same underlying assumption remains, even if the
attitude to it may have changed. To allow the spectre of ontological
nihilism back into the critique would be to risk inviting back in the
metaphysical baggage which has always gone along with the notion
1 Miilamadhyamakakarika 24.10. My translation of the Sanskrit:
vyavaharam anasrityaparamartho na desyate I
paramartham anagamya nirval)al1J nadhigamyate 11
Sanskrit edited by Louis de la Vallee Poussin, Miilamadhyamakakarika de
Niigiirjuna avec la Prasannapada Commentaire de Candraklrti, Bibliotheca Buddhica
IV (St Petersburg, 1903-13) p494.12-13.
2 Wittgenstein op cit 124, p49.
3 Miilamadhyamakakarika 25.19. My translation of the Sanskrit:
na sal1Jsiirasya nirviil)at kil1J cid asti vise$al)am I
na nirval)asya sall)siirat kill) cid asti vise$al)am 11
Sanskrit edited by Louis de la Vallee Poussin, op cit p535.2-3.
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of 'nihilism'. Instead, as I have already hinted at with my reference
to recent comparisons between Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein, and in
keeping with trends in twentieth century philosophy generally,
Nagarjuna's, and Buddhism's conception of ethics is transplanted
into the realm of language. Nathan Katz, for example, remarks that
Buddhism holds 'the belief in a self to be a merely 'a grammatical
mistake'.1 Nagarjuna's refutation of an inherent nature, Katz
suggests, is 'a grammatical rather than ontological statement'.2
Nagarjuna's ethical framework suddenly centres around a critique
of language and is divorced from epistemology and ontology. Chris
Gudmunsen too argues that
[t]he advantages of absolute over conventional truth, or of
nirval}a over samsara are not advantages of correctness or
validity ... [but] advantages stemming from a better attitude to
life.3
Noticeable here, although Gudmunsen's point is basically a good
one, is the way he has had to separate the epistemological from the
ethical: 'correctness' and 'validity' are sharply delineated from 'a
better attitude to life'. In Wittgensteinian terms, Gudmunsen's tacit
assumption is that ethics and epistemology operate in separate
'language-games'.4 The tendency is part of the overall postmodern
1 Nathan Katz, 'Nagarjuna and Wittgenstein on Error' in Nathan Katz (ed) Buddhist
and Western Philosophy, (Delhi, 1981) p323.
2 [bid, p319.
3 Chris Gudmunsen, Wittgenstein and Buddhism, (London and Basingstoke,
1977), pl03, my italics. For a more comprehensive critique of Wittgensteinian
and linguistic interpretations of Nagarjuna, see David Loy, 'How not to criticize
Nagarjuna: A Response to L. Stanford Betty' in Philosophy East and West Vol. 34
No.4 (October 1984) and also A.P.Tuck, Comparative Philosophy and the
Philosophy of Scholarship: On the Western Interpretation of Nagarjuna, (New York
and Oxford, 1990) Ch4, 'Buddhism after Wittgenstein', p74ff.
4 I hasten to add though that this strict distinction between language games
actually seems foreign to Wittgenstein himself insofar as it promotes a view that
language games suggest a sort of closed linguistic system. Often within accounts
which attempt to justify the autonomy of religious language by appealing to
Wittgenstein (perhaps paradoxically, since in their very need to appeal they
undermine that very autonomy they are trying to protect), this sort of
misinterpretation that 'language games' are mutually incomprehensible 'closed
systems' has been responsible for a certain spectre of relativism looming over
neo-Wittgensteinian interpreters, particularly those concerned with religious
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imperative to sever all connections between ethics and epistemology
and ontology.
Yet Buddhist thinkers such as Candraklrti, Dharmaklrti and
Dignaga, not to mention Nagarjuna himself, would take issue with
any suggestion that epistemological 'correctness' and 'validity'
had nothing to do with dispelling the ignorance (avidya) which
gives rise to suffering (du1}.kha). Ignorance - both epistemological
and ethical (not that the two are traditionally separated) - obscures
things as they are (tattva) and hence impedes any possibility of a
'better attitude to life'. It was precisely this insistence on the
integration of intellectual rigour and morality that was at the heart
of Atisa's reforms, just as it was for Tsong kha pa's later
systemisation of Tibetan Buddhism and the consolidation of the
'Gradual Path', the lam rim. Indeed, the Indian Buddhist tradition,
like all other Indian systems, has in fact always used the same term,
artha, to denote both an epistemologically valid object and moral or
ethical purpose or meaning, and the Tibetan tradition has followed
this exactly with the term don.
All of which means that there is little room here for the
postmodern insistence upon severing the connection between ethics
and epistemology, as is implied in Gudmunsen's Wittgensteinian
analysis, since, within the Buddhist tradition, ethics and
epistemology had always been so tightly welded together (not of
course, that they were ever considered separate realms which even
needed to be welded together in the first place). Without
conceptions of separate epistemological and ethical realms, there
was no tenuous relation which needed to be maintained by
appealing to an underlying ontology and hence there was no need
for a Nietzsche-like figure to expose just how tenuous this relation
could be and how shaky this underlying ontology was. And of
course, this tenuous relation, and the underlying ontology which it
desperately maintains, is precisely the object of the postmodern
critique. Although, at the same time of course, Buddhism does
indeed take an underlying ontology such as the misconception of
an essence or abiding self as the object of its critique too.
But to summarize the key difference between the Buddhist and
postmodem critiques, we need to remember Aristotle's law of the
excluded middle - which incidentally, Nagarjuna adheres to as well.
We need to remember that all critiques, and more basically, all
language. See Dan R. Stiver, The Philosophy of Religious Language (MaIden,
Mass. and Oxford, 1996), p65ff for a useful summary of this issue.
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negations, set up a mutual exclusion: an 'either...or' or an 'a and
not-a'. There are two, and only two, sides, which makes it difficult
to fit the three elements we are dealing with - ethics, epistemology
and ontology - into a straightforward critique. Two will have to fall
on one side and one on the other. Both the postmodemists and the
Buddhists agree that ontology (in the form of an underlying
essence) ought to go on the negated or critiqued 'not-a' side and
that ethics ought to go on the other side of the mutual exclusion:
the affirmed 'a' side. But on which side does epistemology belong?
What I would suggest is that this is where the key difference in their
respective critiques lies.
For the Buddhists, epistemology and ethics have always been
tightly bound together and clearly separated from ontology,
meaning that there is enough conceptual room to negate ontology
and reaffirm ethics without endangering epistemology: ethics and
epistemology can be placed together on the affirmed 'a' side of
any critique of metaphysics, while ontology can be isolated on the
'not-a' side. The conception of ontology which the Buddhists
refute, such as an inherent nature (svabhava) and a self (atman), are
far more self-contained units which can be negated without
epistemological and ethical artha being affected (although this is of
course precisely what their opponents have always maintained).
The postmodem critique, on the other hand, has not had the
same conceptual room to move. Safeguarding ethics - ensuring it
remains on the affirmed 'a' side - has meant placing traditional
epistemology on the 'not-a' side along with ontology, since the
conception of ontology which postmodemists have sought to
challenge has been so closely entwined with traditional
epistemology and epistemological validity, as the representational
(Platonic) model of 'being' and 'truth' would suggest. Essentially,
the problem is that the conceptual constraints which postmodernism
has attempted to negate have been exactly the same conceptual
constraints from which it has attempted to negate. If traditional
ontology is to be undermined then traditional epistemology has to
be thrown out too, and so if ethics is to be saved, then it has to be
saved on its own: epistemology and ontology would have to be
siphoned off together leaving ethics isolated, or, to put a positive
spin on it, ethics would need to exist autonomously.
Ironically, this is also the only option that Mrs Moore, Schlegel
and, most especially, Hegel envisaged too, only they imagined that
this very same autonomy or isolation of ethics, its being left 'high
and dry', amounted to its disappearance altogether in a relativistic
moral void. The postmodem isolation and subsequent
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transplantation of ethics away from metaphysics and toward context,
functionality or, more formally, Pragmatics and praxis, does not
really seem to have solved this problem. In effect, it seems to have
simply amounted to a shift in terminology, or perhaps merely a
shift in the emphasis upon the same terminology: a delicate
balancing act between, on the on hand, the negative isolation of
ethics; and, on the other, the positive autonomy of ethics - which,
curiously enough, ends up sounding almost Kantian. Those
promoting traditional metaphysics and those challenging it seem
bound by the same conceptual restraints, perhaps most interestingly
of all when they attempt to negate them.
Thus, the Marabar Cave may yet prove just as difficult to escape
for the postmodernists and postcolonialists as it was for the
modernists and Romantics. There is another (darker?) side to the
echo, a warning which goes in the 'opposite' direction. Non-duality
seems just as problematic for those who attempt to critique
traditional western conceptions of being, truth and morality and
who eagerly draw upon Indian or Buddhist thought in order to
vindicate this critique as it was for those who earlier attacked Indian
and Buddhist thought so as to uphold traditional metaphysics. The
same hidden demons re-emerge and, worst still, they are still
revealed as being none other than the interpreter's, or the
comparativist's, own. They are the same old demons who lurk in
that most terrifying, yet simultaneously most narcissisticly 'cosy'
and reassuring dark side of all: the sound of one's own 'dull echo'.
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